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ARTICLE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ARTISTIC PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS: THE RIGHT TO MANIFEST ONE’S INNER
STATE
Locke Adair
I. INTRODUCTION
“Expression” is “the outer manifestation of an inner state.” 1 “We the
People” are protected by the First Amendment when the government tries to
regulate our “inner state.”2 However, artistic business owners face a threat to
their freedom of expression. Some courts have found that public
accommodations laws may compel artists to express themselves in a way that
violates their consciences. This paper is about all such artists who sell their
artistic products or services and what the First Amendment requires when
public accommodations laws are applied to them.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 3 This
prohibition applies equally to state governments. 4 “If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”5 Not only does the First Amendment protect
the right to speak, but also the right to not speak. Supreme Court precedent
makes clear that the right to speak freely includes the right to refrain from
speaking.6
However, that right is not without its limits. “[A]n incidental burden on
speech . . . is permissible . . . so long as the neutral regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
1

John Hospers, Philosophy of Art, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-art/Art-as-expression.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3
Id.
4
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963) (“It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
assembly, and petition] are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the
States.”).
5
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
6
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
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the regulation.” 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
First Amendment does not protect certain discriminatory conduct, even if
such conduct is accomplished through speech. 8 For example, in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., Teresa Harris worked as a manager at an equipment
rental company.9 The president, Charles Hardy, “often insulted her because
of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.”10
Harris sued the company, “claiming that Hardy’s conduct had created an
abusive work environment for her because of her gender.”11 Hardy argued
that the insults and innuendos were protected speech.12 However, the Court
essentially ignored Hardy’s First Amendment claim and held in favor of
Harris.13
Much of the debate related to artistic services is whether a particular
service is properly understood as “expression” or “conduct.” For example,
when a sculptor refuses to create and provide a sculpture for a gay couple’s
wedding, the sculptor may understand his refusal as a refusal to express
support for same-sex marriages. But the gay couple may see the refusal of
service as a discriminatory business practice, akin to employment
discrimination. Conversely, when the sculptor crafts a one-of-a-kind
sculpture for such an event, the sculptor may view his sculpture as an artistic
expression of profound emotions and ideas; the customers, however, may see
it simply as a provision of a bargained-for good. Courts need a rule that
strikes the balance between preventing discriminatory conduct and
protecting the freedom of expression.
Section II of this article describes public accommodations laws and how
they may affect freedom of expression. Section III discusses how courts have
defined “compelled speech” and how they have applied that doctrine to
public accommodations laws. Section IV evaluates the various proposals and
discusses the rule courts should apply when faced with this question. Section
V presents a conclusion.

7
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
8
See id. at 62–63; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
9
Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Brief for Respondent at 43, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92–
1168).
13
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
Places of public accommodation must be open to everyone.14 This axiom
is deeply rooted in the American legal system. 15 As early as the sixteenth
century, innkeepers and common carriers were “obligated to serve all
potential customers” under the common law.16 This axiom became codified
after the Civil War through state public accommodations statutes to protect
black customers from discrimination by business owners. 17 The federal
government also codified the common law obligation in the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 and later in the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title II of which provides:
“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”18
“Public accommodations laws enforce the basic and fundamental right to
be treated as an equal in American society.”19 “The ‘fundamental object’ of
public accommodations laws is to prevent the ‘deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments.’”20 This “[p]rivate discrimination ‘sap[s] the moral fiber of
the Nation,’21 and ‘mars the atmosphere of a united and classless society in
which this Nation rose to greatness.’” 22 Public accommodations laws
“‘send[ ] a clear message to . . . places of public accommodations’ that they
may not deny historically disadvantaged groups the ‘equally effective and
meaningful opportunity to benefit from all aspects of life in America.’”23
A.

Current Statutes and Ordinances

Unlike the federal statute, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
include “sexual orientation” as a protected class in their public
14
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 763 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J., concurring
in part).
15
Id.
16
Id. (citing Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 276–77 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
17
Id.
18
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)).
19
Id. at 764.
20
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 935 (Ariz. 2019) (Bales, J.,
dissenting).
21
Telescope, 936 F.3d at 764 (Kelly, J., concurring in part) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7379
(1964)).
22
Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7399 (1964)).
23
Id. (quoting 135 CONG. REC. 8506 (1989)).
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accommodations laws.24 Five states do not have public accommodations laws
at all.25 Seventeen states prohibit discrimination based on “marital status.”26
For example, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act includes both “sexual
orientation” and “marital status” as protected classes:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person,
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an
individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin,
or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation . . . .27
Even in states where no statute forbids discrimination based on sexual
orientation, cities within the state may have public accommodations
ordinances that include “sexual orientation” as a protected class. 28 For
example, while Arizona does not have a state public accommodations law
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the City of Phoenix
has an ordinance that prohibits public accommodations from discriminating
against a person based on “sexual orientation.”29
There are various definitions of a “place of public accommodation”
amongst different statutes and ordinances. Colorado defines a “place of
public accommodation” in part as “any place of business engaged in any sales
to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations to the public, including but not limited to any business
offering wholesale or retail sales to the public.”30 Colorado goes on in the
statute to list many other categories falling within Colorado’s definition of a
place of public accommodation. 31 Colorado does limit its definition by
stating that a “‘[p]lace of public accommodation’ shall not include a church,

24

State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (April 8, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodationlaws.aspx.
25
Id. (listing Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas as not having
public accommodations laws as to nondisabled people).
26
Id.
27
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2014) (emphasis added).
28
State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 24.
29
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41–1442(A) (LexisNexis 2010); PHX., ARIZ., CITY CODE § 18–4(B)(1)
(2011); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 898 (Ariz. 2019)).
30
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–601(1) (2014).
31
Id.
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synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious
purposes.”32
New Mexico defines a place of public accommodation as “any
establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations
or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or other
place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.”33 Not
all public accommodations laws define “a place of public accommodation”
with limitations. California’s public accommodations law provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition,
genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation,
citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever.34
“California courts have read ‘business establishment’ to embrace all
commercial and non-commercial entities open to and serving the general
public.”35
B.

Compelled Speech in Places of Public Accommodations

This raises a question as to artistic businesses refusing service in violation
of public accommodations laws. Does the artist’s constitutional right of free
expression permit discrimination in violation of a public accommodations
law? Does the First Amendment allow the government to compel artists to
send messages in their art that violate their consciences? The Supreme Court
skirted these questions in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.
In Masterpiece, Jack Phillips was a devout Christian and expert baker.36
One of his beliefs was that “God’s intention for marriage from the beginning
of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.”37
Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins solicited Phillips’s bakery, Masterpiece

32

Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(H) (2020).
34
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (Deering 2016) (emphasis added).
35
Pamela Griffin, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment
Limitations Upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1053 (1985).
36
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
37
Id.
33
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Cakeshop.38 Craig and Mullins were a same-sex couple planning to marry.39
Craig and Mullins requested one of Phillips’s wedding cakes. 40 Phillips
refused the customers, informing them that “he does not ‘create’ wedding
cakes for same-sex weddings.”41 Phillips was willing to sell other goods, just
not a custom wedding cake.42 Phillips explained, “to create a wedding cake
for an event that celebrates something that directly goes against the teachings
of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and participation in
the ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.”43
The couple filed suit with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.44 The
Commission found that Phillips violated the public accommodations law.45
However, when the case reached the Supreme Court, it held that the
Commission violated Phillips’s constitutional rights by exhibiting religious
animus as it decided the case, and the Court never answered the compelled
speech question.46
Whether the First Amendment protects artistic public accommodations
against forced expression is not a question restricted to bakeries. Numerous
lower courts have dealt with artistic service providers who refused service to
same-sex couples. A photographer has refused to shoot a same-sex wedding
ceremony. 47 In order to lawfully turn away gay couples, videographers
preemptively brought suit against the constitutionality of the public
accommodations law as would be applied to the videographers.48 A florist
objected to providing flowers for a same-sex couple.49 Calligraphers declined
to create wedding invitations.50
Nor is this question unique to the United States. The United Kingdom has
dealt with its share of cases. In Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Limited, a
Christian baker was asked to bake a cake that would say “support gay

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1723.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1723–24.
47
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 1, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M.
2013).
48
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 749–50. (8th Cir. 2019).
49
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wash. 2019).
50
See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 900 (Ariz. 2019).
39
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marriage.”51 The baker objected.52 The court decided that the objection was
against the message of the cake and not against the customer.53 In finding for
the baker, the court reasoned that “[t]he bakery would have refused to supply
this particular cake to anyone, whatever their personal characteristics.”54
American courts need guidance on this issue. Some courts do not interfere
with the artist’s “inner state.” 55 Others force artists to express messages
against their will.56 Future cases are sure to arise. In the next case, perhaps,
the government will compel a baker to artfully craft a wedding cake, a painter
to depict a particular scene, or a violinist to perform. Artists must be free to
manifest their inner state in a way that is consistent with who they are.
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A.

Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Compelled Speech and
Association

The Supreme Court has clearly held that the First Amendment prohibits
the government from both suppressing and compelling speech.57 In Wooley
v. Maynard, New Hampshire required drivers to bear a license plate with the
words “Live Free or Die.”58 New Hampshire made it a crime to obscure those
words on the license plate.59 The Maynards considered “Live Free or Die”
“repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs.”60 Because of their
beliefs, the Maynards covered up New Hampshire’s motto on their license
plate. 61 Mr. Maynard was arrested and fined multiple times because he
refused to violate his conscience by displaying the message.62 Mr. Maynard
filed suit against the state of New Hampshire claiming the law was
unconstitutional.63

51

Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. Ltd. [2018] 49 UKSC 843, 843 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
Id.
53
Id. at 858–59.
54
Id. at 859.
55
See Brush & Nib, 448 P.3d at 926; see also Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d
740, 758 (8th Cir. 2019).
56
See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 79, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M.
2013); see also State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1237 (Wash. 2019).
57
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
58
Id. at 707.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 707–08.
62
Id. at 708.
63
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 709.
52
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The Court held that a state may not compel “an individual to participate
in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”64
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment protects the right to refrain
from speaking and that the state’s interest did not outweigh the private
interest. 65 Thus, the state could not compel the Maynards to speak the
government’s message.
Compelled speech collides directly with public accommodations laws
where businesses want to refrain from expressing certain messages. The
Supreme Court has stated, “It is well settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost
merely because compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker
because he or she is paid to speak.” 66 However, when association with
particular people or groups is said to express something in itself—as in socalled “expressive association” claims—some businesses might claim that any
law forcing them to serve certain customers constitutes compelled
association as well as compelled expression in violation of the First
Amendment.
Courts have sometimes upheld public accommodations laws despite the
First Amendment challenge. Businesses have tried and failed to get away with
race discrimination in violation of civil rights acts through their freedom of
association rights.67 Other organizations have tried to discriminate based on
gender or sexual orientation. 68 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, a nonprofit membership corporation prohibited the full membership of women.69
The corporation was a public accommodation within the meaning of the
state’s public accommodations law.70 The Court upheld the law as applied to
the corporation, thus compelling the Jaycees to admit women as regular
members.71 The Court reasoned:
[I]f enforcement of the Act causes some incidental
abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that effect is no
greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate
purposes. As we have explained, acts of invidious
64

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714–17.
66
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).
67
See generally Watson v. Fraternal Ord. of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990).
68
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 614 (1984); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
69
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
70
Id. at 626.
71
Id. at 627.
65
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discrimination in the distribution of publicly available
goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent—wholly
apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.
Accordingly, like violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct
from their communicative impact, such practices are
entitled to no constitutional protection.72
In another freedom of association case, however, the Court reached a
different conclusion. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Boy Scouts
revoked James Dale’s membership when the Boy Scouts learned that he was
“an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.”73 “The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that New Jersey’s public accommodations law require[d] that the
Boy Scouts readmit Dale.”74 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the application of the public accommodations law
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of “expressive association.”75
The Court reasoned that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive activity and
that the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’
expression. 76 Dale argued that intermediate scrutiny articulated in United
States v. O’Brien should apply.77 The O’Brien test provides:
[A] government regulation [of expressive conduct] is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.78
The Court rejected Dale’s argument and applied strict scrutiny because the
“public accommodations law directly and immediately affects associational
rights” protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to incidentally

72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 628 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1976)).
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 653–59.
Id. at 659.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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affecting those rights.79 The Court distinguished Roberts because the addition
of women in that case did not impose a serious burden on the male members’
freedom of expressive association rights, since the Jaycees’ organizational
mission did not encompass any views on women or gender relations.80 Thus,
New Jersey was prohibited from compelling the Boy Scouts to reinstate
Dale.81
The unanimous decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR dealt with both the freedom
of speech and expressive association.82 In Rumsfeld, the Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”) brought suit to prohibit the
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, a federal statute requiring law
schools to permit campus entry for military recruiters or lose federal funding.
83
FAIR objected and argued that the Solomon Amendment violated their
freedom of “expressive association.” 84 FAIR also objected on compelled
speech grounds because the Amendment required a choice between
disseminating a military recruiter’s messages or losing funding for the
school.85 Certain law schools did not want to disseminate military messages
because they disagreed with the military’s policy on homosexuals.86
The Court held that the Solomon Amendment did not violate law schools’
freedom of association rights merely because it required some level of
interaction with the recruiters. 87 The recruiters were not becoming
“members of the school’s expressive association.”88 The Court also held that
the Solomon Amendment did not violate law schools’ freedom of speech.89
The Court reasoned that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not
speech. 90 The Court also said that even if the Amendment regulated
expressive conduct, the Amendment would stand as applied to the law
schools under the O’Brien test.91 The Court said that the conduct regulated in
the Solomon Amendment—denying campus entry to military recruiters—

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 659.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 69.
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 67–68.
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was an activity that might be, but need not be, expressive; thus, it could be
deemed “conduct,” with any expressive element being merely incidental.92
Before Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court addressed the free speech issue in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay. In Hurley, the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council, a private nonprofit association, operated a yearly St.
Patrick’s Day parade. 93 A group of gay, lesbian, and bisexuals formed an
organization (“GLIB”) to “march in the parade as a way to express pride in
their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals.”94 The
operators of the parade refused to admit GLIB.95 GLIB sued and alleged a
violation of the state’s public accommodations law, which provided that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was prohibited in “the
admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement.”96 The Court held that applying this
law to the Council would result in compelled speech because the content of
the operators’ message would have changed if the government compelled the
owners to admit GLIB as a unit in the parade.97 The Court noted that a parade
is inherently expressive and that GLIB’s parade unit was equally expressive
and “formed for the very purpose of marching in it . . . to celebrate its
members’ identity as openly gay.”98 Thus, the “requirement to admit a parade
contingent expressing a message not of the private organizers’ own choosing
violates the First Amendment.” 99 Later in Rumsfeld, however, the Court
distinguished Hurley because “schools are not speaking when they host
interviews and recruiting receptions.”100 Further, the parade in Hurley had an
“expressive quality” that was lacking in the school’s recruitment services.101
A crucial point in these cases is the distinction between regulation of
speech and regulations of conduct. The line between speech and conduct is
not always clear. The Supreme Court protects conduct as speech if it satisfies
the two conditions under the Spence test: (1) “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present,” and (2) “in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 66.
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 560 (1995).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 572 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1992)).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568–70.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
Id.
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by those who viewed it.”102 However, Hurley acknowledged that the Spence
test does not detect all protected expression. 103 In particular, the Court
pointed out that Spence’s requirement of “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ . . . would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”104
After the Court found that both the GLIB unit and the parade itself were
inherently expressive, the Court stated that the public accommodations law
was “applied in a peculiar way.”105 This was because “[i]ts enforcement does
not address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, lesbian, [and]
bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the parade.”106 The problem
was that GLIB wanted admission to carry its own banner.107 The Court then
reasoned that the parade may not be compelled to speak GLIB’s message
because this would have “the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to
be the public accommodation.” 108 In a unanimous decision, the Court
refused to compel the private parade owners to admit GLIB as a parade
unit.109
Lower courts that face the question of whether artistic businesses must
provide expressive services to an individual in a protected class look to
Wooley, Roberts, Dale, Rumsfeld, and Hurley to form their opinions.
However, courts have used those cases differently, resulting in a variety of
holdings.
B.

Lower Court Opinions Applying the Freedom of Expression Right to
Public Accommodations Laws
1.

Eighth Circuit: Telescope Media Group v. Lucero

In the Eighth Circuit case Telescope Media Group v. Lucero, the Larsen’s
were wedding videographers who used their “unique skill[s] to identify and
tell compelling stories through video.” 110 The Larsens alleged that they
“gladly work with all people—regardless of their race, sexual orientation, sex,
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581.
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2019).
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religious beliefs, or any other classification.” 111 However, “the Larsens
decline[d] any requests for their services that conflict[ed] with their religious
beliefs.”112 Such services included any services that “contradict biblical truth;
promote sexual immorality; support the destruction of unborn children;
promote racism or racial division; incite violence; degrade women; or
promote any conception of marriage other than as a lifelong institution
between one man and one woman.” 113 Accordingly, though the Larsens
would “gladly work with all people,” they limited their wedding video
services to opposite-sex weddings in order to “affect the cultural narrative
regarding marriage.” 114 The Larsens sued to prevent Minnesota from
enforcing its public accommodations law against them.115 The Eighth Circuit
held that Minnesota could not compel the videographers to create wedding
videos for same-sex couples.116
The court largely based its reasoning on Hurley, stating that Minnesota
had applied the public accommodations law in a content-based manner.117
Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny.118 In the court’s analysis, the court
stated, “Hurley is particularly instructive.” 119 Public accommodations laws
are “generally constitutional,” but a “‘peculiar’ application that required
speakers ‘to alter the[ir] expressive content’ was not.”120 The court said that
the Court in Hurley “drew the line exactly where the Larsens ask us to here:
to prevent the government from requiring their speech to serve as a public
accommodation for others.”121
The court also relied on Dale.122 The court said, “Dale makes clear that
once conduct crosses over to speech or other expression, the government’s
ability to regulate it is limited.” 123 The majority opinion did not discuss
Rumsfeld in its reasoning. However, the majority opinion did distinguish
Roberts:

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Telescope, 936 F.3d at 758.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Telescope, 936 F.3d at 755.
Id.
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[T]he Supreme Court emphasized that an all-male social
club had failed to show that a law requiring the admission of
female members ‘impose[d] any serious burdens on the male
members’ freedom of expressive association’ or ‘impede[d]
the organization’s ability to engage in . . . protected activities
or to disseminate its preferred views.’124
In understanding Roberts, the Eighth Circuit said, “The
unmistakable message is that antidiscrimination laws can regulate
conduct, but not expression.”125
2.

New Mexico Supreme Court: Elane Photography, LLC v.
Willock

The same issue arose in the New Mexico Supreme Court. In Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, the co-owner and lead photographer of Elane
Photography, LLC, was “personally opposed to same-sex marriage” and
would “not photograph any image or event that violates her religious
beliefs.” 126 Vanessa Willock contacted Elane Photography to see if the
company would be available to photograph her wedding to another
woman.127 The owner responded that “Elane Photography photographs only
‘traditional weddings.’” 128 Willock replied, “Are you saying that your
company does not offer your photography service to same-sex couples?”129
The owner stated, “Yes, you are correct in saying we do not photograph
same-sex weddings.”130 Willock sued Elane Photography “for discriminating
against her based on her sexual orientation” in violation of the New Mexico
public accommodations law.131
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the public accommodations
law “does not violate Elane Photography’s First Amendment right to refrain
from speaking.”132 The court reasoned that the law did “not compel Elane
Photography to speak the government’s message,” citing Wooley. 133 The
124
125
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2013).
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at ¶ 7, 309 P.3d at 59.
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court said that the holding in Wooley is narrow and applies to laws requiring
someone to display the government’s message.134 The court analogized the
case to Rumsfeld and stated, “Like the law in Rumsfeld, the [public
accommodations law] does not require any affirmation of belief by regulated
public accommodations; instead, it requires businesses that offer services to
the public at large to provide those services without regard for race, sex,
sexual orientation, or other protected classifications.”135
The court reasoned that the law did “not compel Elane Photography to
host or accommodate the message of another speaker” because it is a forprofit public accommodation.136 The court understood that because “[t]he
United States Supreme Court has never found a compelled-speech violation
arising from the application of antidiscrimination laws to a for-profit public
accommodation,” that means that compelling someone to provide a
“message-for-hire” does not constitute “host[ing] or accommodat[ing] the
message of another.”137 The court went on to say that where the United States
Supreme Court found public accommodations laws to be misapplied is when
it is applied to “free-speech events such as privately organized parades and
private membership organizations.” 138 The court distinguished the
photography business in that “Elane Photography . . . is an ordinary public
accommodation, a ‘clearly commercial entit[y]’ that sells goods and services
to the public.” 139 The court distinguished the facts of Hurley and Dale by
recognizing that “Elane Photography sells its expressive services to the
public.”140 The court said, “The cases in which the United States Supreme
Court found that the government unconstitutionally required a speaker to
host or accommodate another speaker’s message are distinctly different
because they involve direct government interference with the speaker’s own
message, as opposed to a message-for-hire.”141
Elane Photography tried to argue that the public accommodations law
violated Elane Photography’s freedom of expression rights. 142 The court
rejected this argument and stated that because Elane Photography “is a public
accommodation, its provision of services can be regulated, even though those
134
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services include artistic and creative work.”143 The court stated that it would
be different “[i]f Elane Photography took photographs on its own time and
sold them at a gallery, or if it was hired by certain clients but did not offer its
services to the general public” because then the public accommodations law
would not apply to Elane Photography.144 The court recognized a difference
between photographers offering services to a select few and Elane
Photography producing photographs “for hire in the ordinary course of its
business as a public accommodation.”145 The court further stated, “It may be
that Elane Photography expresses its clients’ messages in its photographs, but
only because it is hired to do so.”146 Therefore, the court held that the public
accommodations law could force the owner to express herself in a way that is
inconsistent with her beliefs.147
3.

Arizona Supreme Court: Brush & Nib v. City of Phoenix

The Arizona Supreme Court took a stance more in line with the Eighth
Circuit. In Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, Duka and Koski were
the sole member-owners of a for-profit limited liability company.148 Duka
and Koski were Christians. 149 They sought to operate their business
consistent with their religious beliefs that “‘God created two distinct genders
in His image,’ and that only a man and a woman can be joined in marriage.”150
Duka and Koski were also artists “specializing in creating custom artwork for
weddings, events, special occasions, home décor, and businesses.” 151 The
owners had some products that were pre-made and some that were
personally designed by the owners.152 Though the owners “sell their products
online through various media platforms,” the owners conceded that the
business is a public accommodation as defined by the Phoenix public
accommodations ordinance. 153 The products at issue were custom
invitations.154 As in Telescope Media Group, the owners brought suit against
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the City of Phoenix to prevent the city from enforcing their public
accommodations ordinance against their artistic business in the future.155
Phoenix conceded that the public accommodations law does not require
the artists “to create a custom invitation containing the statement, ‘support
gay marriage,’ or symbols, such as the equal sign of the Human Rights
Campaign.”156 But the City argued that the public accommodations law, even
as applied to the artists’ custom wedding invitations, “regulates conduct, not
speech.”157 The City contended that refusing to create or sell custom wedding
invitations for use in same-sex weddings was discriminatory conduct
prohibited by the public accommodations law, and any expression (or
silence) by the business or artist is merely incidental to that conduct.158
The Arizona Supreme Court held that Phoenix’s public accommodations
law as applied to the artists’ custom wedding invitations violated the artists’
free speech rights. 159 The court discussed the issue of whether the custom
invitations constituted conduct or speech. 160 The court distinguished two
forms of protected speech, “pure speech” and “conduct that is ‘sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication.’” 161 According to the court, the
latter must pass the Spence test, while “pure speech” would be fully
protected.162 The court found that the invitations were “pure speech” because
each invitation “contains their hand-drawn words, images, and calligraphy,
as well as their hand-painted images and original artwork.”163 Additionally,
the artists were “intimately connected with the words and artwork contained
in their invitations.”164
The court relied on Hurley to determine whether the public
accommodations law would be upheld. 165 The court recognized that the
Phoenix public accommodations law “is a facially content-neutral law that
generally targets discriminatory conduct, not speech.”166 However, the court
believed that the law, “as applied to Plaintiffs’ custom wedding invitations,
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operates as a content-based law.” 167 The court stated that the law, as in
Hurley, declared the artists’ “speech itself to be the public accommodation,”
and thus the court applied strict scrutiny. 168 The court said that the
government “interest is not sufficiently overriding as to justify compelling
Plaintiffs’ speech by commandeering their creation of custom wedding
invitations.” 169 The court also said that “because the purpose of the
Ordinance is to regulate conduct, not speech, regulating Plaintiffs’ speech is
not narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal.”170
The inconsistent holdings in the lower courts demand guidance from the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court has provided key
principles to follow. Rumsfeld upheld a public accommodations law where
there was merely an incidental burden on expression.171 Alternatively, Hurley
demonstrated how a public accommodations law cannot be used to change
the content of a public accommodation’s message. 172 While the Supreme
Court has provided insight for these types of cases, there are still questions
demanding further analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
A.

Judicial and Scholarly Commentary

Justice Thomas provided his thoughts on the issue in his concurring
opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 173 He acknowledged that public
accommodations laws generally regulate conduct. 174 Nevertheless, citing
Hurley, Thomas recognized that public accommodations laws may be
applied in a content-based manner where “the First Amendment applies with
full force.” 175 Thomas noted that “Hurley was an example of what [the
Supreme Court] has termed ‘expressive conduct.’”176 “To determine whether
conduct is sufficiently expressive, the Court asks whether it was ‘intended to
be communicative’ and, ‘in context, would reasonably be understood by the
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viewer to be communicative.’” 177 Thomas then noted that O’Brien’s
intermediate scrutiny should “apply [where] the government would have
punished the conduct regardless of its expressive component.”178 Otherwise,
Justice Thomas said that strict scrutiny should apply.179
Applying the facts from Masterpiece to the law he laid out, Thomas said
that the conduct was expressive partly because the artist “takes exceptional
care with each cake that he creates—sketching the design out on paper,
choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and
sculpting the cake, decorating it, and delivering it to the wedding.”180 Further,
he believed that a wedding cake in and of itself expresses support for the
couple the cake is for.181 Thomas states that intermediate scrutiny does not
apply, because “[Colorado] is punishing [the baker] because he refuses to
create custom wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex marriage.”182
Thus, Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny.183
In his recent law review article, Andrew Jensen has proposed a different
test to address the issue.184 Jensen believes, “Creating wedding cakes, even
artistic, expensive, unique cakes is not necessarily expressive conduct.” 185
Jensen laid out a two-prong test to determine whether an artistic wedding
cake is protected under the First Amendment:186 Creating an artistic wedding
cake must either be historically protected as an inherently expressive medium
or pass the Spence test. 187 Jensen said, “Unlike parades, paintings, or
sculptures, which have been repeatedly protected, case law has not extended
Free Speech Clause rights to cake makers, suggesting that it is not a
traditionally protected category.”188 Jensen further reasoned that the conduct
at issue in Masterpiece failed the Spence test because artistic wedding cakes in
177
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and of themselves do not have a particularized message.189 Jensen supported
his reasoning with the fact that the baker refused the same-sex couple service
“before learning of their specifications and design preferences. Without
knowing what words or designs would be incorporated, the cake would not
be likely to convey any particular message.” 190 Jensen does note, however,
that the First Amendment would protect the baker if the couple requested a
rainbow cake or something similar supporting gay rights on its face.191
Jensen misunderstood the expressiveness of artistically designed wedding
cakes. His analysis assumes that artistic wedding cakes do not send a
particularized message.192 This is simply not true, because wedding cakes in
and of themselves celebrate and promote the marriage of the couple,
regardless of the design.193 Specific words or symbols are not needed on a
wedding cake for a reasonable observer to know whether the wedding cake
displayed at a wedding conveys the particularized message of support for (or
at least no objection to) the wedding. 194 Reasonable observers would
understand the wedding cake to express support for the couple if it is a unique
artistic creation that the couple chose to use and display to celebrate their
wedding.195 The cake would be uniquely designed for the wedding regardless
of the customer’s specifications or lack thereof. Therefore, the baker who
provides a uniquely designed wedding cake for a gay couple is understood to
be expressing support, whether or not the customer made specific requests
of how to decorate the cake.
Authors Labdhi Sheth and Molly Christ provide yet a different perspective
in their law review article.196 They claim, “To resolve the freedom of speech
claim, the Court must first determine whether baking a wedding cake is
symbolic speech or a product in the marketplace.” 197 Sheth and Christ
proposed that an artistically designed cake is the expression of the customer
and not the baker, reasoning that “[t]he customer chooses the type of cake,
the occasion, the color of the frosting, and the words on the cake. Thus, the
189
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customer’s First Amendment rights are at issue. The baker is simply paid for
a service and no observer reasonably understands a cake to be the baker’s
message.” 198 Sheth and Christ proposed a broad rule that would remove all
expression rights for business owners providing a service or product for
compensation.199
However, their reasoning is flawed. The Supreme Court has expressly
stated, “It is well settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because
compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is
paid to speak.”200 Again, the amount of specifications that a customer has for
a wedding cake does not change the fact that the baker expresses himself
through the cake within the customer’s specifications. Sheth and Christ are
also wrong about what a reasonable observer would understand about the
cake. Observers would understand that a violinist playing at a wedding is in
support of (or does not object to) the wedding. Similarly, observers would
understand that the baker supports (or does not object to) the wedding when
they see his uniquely designed wedding cake on display at a wedding.
Therefore, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court would reject Sheth and
Christ’s proposed rule.
B.

Proposed Rule for Applying the Freedom of Expression

The freedom of speech does not embrace every human activity. 201 The
Supreme Court, however, has long recognized that First Amendment
protection includes “symbolic speech” and “expressive conduct.” 202
Generally, public accommodations laws do not infringe upon First
Amendment rights. 203 But “there are no doubt innumerable goods and
services that no one could argue implicate the First Amendment.”204 If the
good or service is expressive, the First Amendment may be implicated. 205
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Rumsfeld suggested that the service must be “inherently expressive” to qualify
for protection.206
If a court finds that there is no expression involved in the sale of a good or
service, then the court may compel service without any further analysis. If a
court finds that expression is involved, but the service would not inherently
express the message the artist opposes, then the law will be upheld. In that
case, the regulation of the expression is merely incidental. 207 A business
owner claiming compelled speech because she is being forced to speak to
customers as she rents them vehicles is an example of such a case. If a court
finds that the applicable public accommodations law compels the business to
provide a service that would inherently express the message the artist
opposes, then the law would be deemed a content-based regulation
compelling expression.208 In that case, strict scrutiny would apply, and the
public accommodations law would not stand as applied to the artist.209 This
raises a crucial question: Under what circumstances does a service inherently
express a message the artist opposes?
The Spence test protects conduct as speech if two conditions are met: (1)
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,” and (2) “in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.”210 Rumsfeld characterized this as an
inquiry into whether the conduct at issue was “inherently expressive.” 211
Hurley recognized that if Spence is satisfied, there is protected expression. 212
But Hurley also recognized that in some circumstances, such as certain works
of art or compositions of music, there might be protected expression, even if
Spence is not satisfied. 213 This allows art to be fully protected by the First
Amendment and deemed “inherently expressive” even without a
“particularized message.” 214 Therefore, a court may not use a public
accommodations law to compel an artist to express support for something he
opposes through his own artwork.215
For example, assume an ice sculptor opposes same-sex marriage. Each of
his ice sculptures are one-of-a-kind; each sculpture is uniquely formed. He
206
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works closely with his customers to ensure that the sculpture accurately
depicts what the customer wants. Usually, his sculptures are massive works
of art displayed as the primary decorative piece. A gay couple requests a
sculpture for their wedding. The sculpture will be the primary decorative
piece for the couple’s wedding ceremony. Before the couple mentions any
specific design, the sculptor refuses to create the ice sculpture. The local
public accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The sculptor views his refusal as a way to invoke his freedom of
expression rights.
A court should not allow the public accommodations law to compel the
sculptor to create a unique, one-of-a-kind masterpiece that shows support
for something the sculptor opposes.216 In the context of the display at the
event, the sculpture would have a particularized message related to the
couple’s wedding. The message would convey a celebration of gay marriage
despite the fact that the couple did not have a chance to give any design
specifications. The integral function of the sculpture, in and of itself,
communicates some sort of support for (or at least no objection to) the gay
wedding ceremony. There was no need for the sculptor to listen to any design
specifications. The sculptor would have to create an ice-masterpiece that
contributes to, promotes, and celebrates the same-sex wedding. The
reasonable observer would understand that message through the sculpture’s
grand presence and intricate design. Therefore, providing the service would
inherently express the message the sculptor opposes.
Admittedly, the sculptor is objecting to the message and discriminating
against the couple. The sculptor is refusing a service to a gay couple that he
would provide to a straight couple. While the sculptor may be discriminating
against the couple based on their sexual orientation, he is simultaneously
objecting to the content of his sculpture’s message. As discussed above, in the
context of the gay couple’s wedding, a grand ice-masterpiece would express
support for the event. The content of the sculptor’s message is dependent
upon who and what the sculpture is for. Because the sculpture is to be the
primary decorative piece at a gay couple’s wedding, the content of the
sculpture supports the gay couple. Therefore, the law would be deemed
content based as to the sculptor and would not be upheld.217
Although the creation of an ice sculpture is clearly expressive, not all
services require such time and talent. Some goods are artfully designed by
machines. Many goods have artistic or expressive wrappings. However,
artistic wrappings alone do not give rise to First Amendment protection.
216
217
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For example, suppose a church orders one hundred chocolate bars from
Hershey’s to make s’mores for a church event. Hershey’s refuses to sell
chocolate bars to the church because (hypothetically) Hershey’s is adamantly
opposed to religion. Hershey’s is in violation of the local public
accommodations law. The question is whether making and selling massproduced, pre-made chocolate bars inherently expresses the message
Hershey’s opposes or is mere conduct. A court may not even consider that
the bars might be expressive. If that is the case, then the court must find that
there was no regulation of expression, and the public accommodations law
would stand.
However, it is arguable that the selling of the bars does have expressive
qualities that could amount to “expressive conduct.” Hershey’s has an “intent
to convey a particularized message” with “Hershey’s” designed on the
wrapper and on the bar itself. The particularized message is something like
“this bar came from Hershey’s” (or some other advertising message), and a
reasonable observer at the church would understand that message.
Regardless of where a court lands on the expressiveness of a sale of
Hershey’s bars, the public accommodations law should be upheld as applied
to Hershey’s.218 The regulation of expression is merely incidental. The key
here is that, although the sale of the bars could be “inherently expressive” of
some message, the message does not relate to Hershey’s objection to religion.
The message relates to advertising the Hershey’s brand. Further, a reasonable
observer would know that Hershey’s did not artistically design or craft
anything that is unique for the church event. Nor is the display of the bars an
integral part of the event. Therefore, Hershey’s may be compelled to sell their
chocolate bars to the church.
Courts should determine whether a particular service merits First
Amendment protection by thinking of expression as a spectrum. On the
least-expressive end, there is the sale of pre-made, mass-produced items with
expression unrelated to the business owner’s objection, like the sale of
Hershey’s chocolate. On the most-expressive end, there is the sale and
creation of an elaborate, custom-designed masterpiece expressing the very
message the artist opposes. A court should ask whether the service is more
like a uniquely designed sculpture created to express a particular message as
an integral part of an event, or whether the service is more like the sale of premade, mass-produced chocolate bars that express something unrelated to the
business’s objection. Many artistic businesses can lean towards either end of
the spectrum depending on the circumstances.
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For example, assume a baker opposes same-sex marriage. Every custom
cake he makes is unique. A homosexual couple requests a small cake. The
customers plan to take the cake to a gay rights event where there will be other
non-descript desserts. Before the customers could discuss the type of cake,
the baker refuses to serve the couple.
The baker refuses because of who the cake is for and not the message the
cake would express. The cake might express that it is delicious or that bakers
can be creative, but, whatever the message, it would not be about gay rights.
Additionally, a reasonable observer would not understand the baker to be in
support of gay marriage or gay rights just because the cake is present at the
gay rights event. The cake is not an integral part of the event or on display in
any particular way. The cake would essentially blend in with the other
desserts (maybe even some Hershey’s bars). Whether the service of creating
the cake is expressive or not, the public accommodations law will likely be
upheld because the law incidentally regulates expression.219 The baker would
have to bake the cake.
If, however, the context changes to a gay wedding and the cake is created
and designed as the wedding cake, the service is more similar to the ice
sculpture. A wedding cake is an integral part of the wedding. 220 Reasonable
observers would understand the wedding cake to express support for the
couple by the fact that it is a cake the couple chose to use to celebrate their
wedding.221 The cake would be uniquely designed for the wedding whatever
its design. Therefore, the baker may refuse to provide a uniquely designed
wedding cake for the gay couple.
Further, some cases may involve requests for certain words or symbols on
a cake or other good. Among those cases, public accommodations laws may
not apply at all. For example, a customer requests a small cake with the words
“Support gay marriage.” The customer plans to take the cake to a gay rights
activist event where there will be other non-descript desserts. The baker
refuses to put those words on the cake.
The baker is not discriminating against the customer but is only objecting
to the message. The customer could be heterosexual. This case is different
from the ice sculptor discriminating against the gay couple. The ice sculptor
refused a service to the gay couple he would provide to a straight couple. But
the baker would not provide a cake with the words “Support gay marriage”
to anyone regardless of their personal characteristics.
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Courts need to apply a consistent rule when these issues arise.
Determining where a particular service falls on the “expression spectrum”
allows for courts to protect artists’ rights to express themselves. This
proposed rule also prevents discriminatory conduct where businesses only
discriminate against the person receiving the service and do not object to
what the service is expressing.
V. CONCLUSION
“Expression” is the outer manifestation of a person’s inner state.222 “We
the People” are protected by the First Amendment when the government
tries to regulate our inner state. 223 The Supreme Court recognizes this
protection even for public accommodations owners, especially when their
product or service constitutes an artwork.224 An artist may not be forced to
create a masterpiece that expresses a message the artist opposes. If a court
finds that the applicable public accommodations law compels the artist to
provide a service that would inherently express the message the artist
opposes, the law cannot be applied to the artist. 225 This rule strikes the
balance between preventing discriminatory conduct and protecting the
People’s rights to manifest their inner state.
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